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Abstract 
We present a general-equilibrium behavioural microsimulation model designed to assess long-run 
macroeconomic, fiscal and social consequences of reforms to the tax and transfer system. The behaviour of 
labour supply is assessed along both the extensive and intensive margins, by merging the discrete choice 
and the elasticity of taxable income approaches. General-equilibrium feedback effects are simulated by 
embedding microsimulation in a parsimonious macro model of a small open economy. We estimate and 
calibrate the model to Hungary, and then perform three sets of simulations. The first one explores the 
impact of personal income tax reductions that are identical in cost but different in structure. The second 
one compares three different tax shift scenarios, while the third one evaluates actual policy measures 
between 2008 and 2013. The results suggest that while a cut in the marginal tax rate of high-income 
individuals may boost output, it does not have a significant employment effect. On the other hand, 
programs like the Employee Tax Credit do have a significant employment effect. We find that the policy 
measures introduced since 2008 substantially increase income inequality in the long run; the contribution 
of the changes after 2010 are about four times that of the changes before 2010. Our results highlight that 
taking account of household heterogeneity is crucial in the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of tax and 
transfer reforms.  
JEL Codes: H22, H31, C63 
Keywords: behavioural microsimulation; linked micro macro model; tax system; transfers  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we present a general-equilibrium behavioural microsimulation model designed to assess long-
run macroeconomic, fiscal and social consequences of reforms to the tax and transfer system. We describe 
the model in detail, calibrate it to Hungary, and present simulations of hypothetical as well as actual 
Hungarian reforms from the period between 2008 and 2013.3 Besides presenting a broad yet tractable new 
tool for policy analysis tailored to a particular country, we believe that we provide a useful input for policy 
discussions and evaluations in other European countries about the long-run economic and distributional 
effects of structural reforms.  
The case of Hungary is particularly suited to illustrate the benefits of our approach. Changes to the tax and 
transfer system in Hungary were frequent, large and of various types in the last decade. The Personal 
Income Tax (PIT) code saw five major changes in the period of 2004-14. The most recent changes introduced 
a flat tax of 16% on all personal income, reducing the tax burden on high incomes substantially (and 
increasing somewhat the burden on low incomes). During the period of 2010-13, the generous Employee 
Tax Credit (ECT) scheme for low incomes was eliminated, while the child tax credit was expanded and a cut 
in employee contributions for younger, older and low-skilled workers was passed into law. Meanwhile, the 
maximum length of unemployment benefits has been cut from 12 to 3 months. Large changes in the tax 
and transfer system most often served one or more of the following three main purposes: consolidating the 
public budget, adjusting the system to the government’s redistributive preferences, and stimulating the 
economy. While simple tools are generally sufficient to conduct a static fiscal assessment of a planned policy 
measure, a detailed assessment of the redistributive, labour market, and growth effects is far from 
straightforward. 
Our microsimulation model has two important features. First, it is behavioural, which means that it takes 
into account the labour supply response of individuals at the intensive and extensive margin. This is done 
by merging the elasticity of taxable-income literature (see, for example: Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez et al., 
2012) and the discrete choice labour supply literature (van Soest, 1995; Aaberge et al., 1995; Bargain et al., 
2014). In particular, the intensive margin is interpreted as the number of effective hours worked, and the 
labour supply response at this margin is calibrated using estimates of the taxable-income elasticity for 
Hungary by Bakos et al. (2008) and Kiss and Mosberger (2015). The extensive margin is the participation 
decision, and the labour supply response at this margin is implemented using the discrete choice 
estimations of Galuščák and Kátay (2017).4 
The second important feature is that labour supply shocks, resulting from individual behavioural responses 
to tax and transfer reforms, are fed into a long-run neoclassical model of a small open economy. This linked 
                                                          
3 First simulation results using the model are presented in a non-technical paper assessing the 2011 tax changes in Hungary (Benczúr 
et al., 2011)..  
4 We also performed similar simulation exercises based on the gains to work approach of Benczúr et al. (2012) and Benczúr and 
Kátay (2017). The results, which are very close to the ones presented in the paper, are available upon request. 
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micro-macro modelling approach has important advantages. Shifts in labour supply will, in the long run, 
lead to changes in wages, corporate profits and thus a change in the demand for capital. By embedding the 
labour supply model in a macro model, we can take account of these general-equilibrium feedback effects. 
More importantly, this approach enables us to assess the macroeconomic and labour market effects of 
changes to the corporate side of taxation. Still, the macro model is parsimonious and transparent: it consists 
of an aggregate production function and a capital supply curve, ensuring that input prices equal their 
marginal products and that capital supply is elastic.  
Both main features of the model fit into recent tendencies in microsimulation modelling (see, e.g., 
Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005; Williamson et al., 2009; Gravelle, 2015; Aaberge and Colombino, 2015) for 
recent surveys.  
Early work on incorporating behavioural responses includes work by Aaberge et al. (2000), Blundell et al. 
(2000), and Creedy and Duncan (2002). Immervoll et al. (2007) simulated the effects of two hypothetical 
welfare-reform scenarios in 15 European countries based on the EUROMOD microsimulation model. 
Immervoll et al. (2007) stress the importance of taking into account the behavioural labour-supply response 
not just at the intensive margin but also at the extensive margin, since the evaluation of a welfare reform 
hinges crucially at the extensive-margin response.  
By now, the extensive margin adjustment has become a standard ingredient of labour supply estimations, 
assuming a discrete choice from a small set of possible hours worked (including inactivity, part-time, full-
time and overtime, or sometimes a more refined set). The most frequently adopted methodology is based 
on Bargain et al. (2014). Aaberge and Colombino (2014) presents a large but still admittedly incomplete 
review of many analyses following similar approaches (Table 1 of Aaberge and Colombino, 2014). 
We, on the other hand, want to incorporate also the taxable income elasticity approach to the intensive 
margin adjustment, on top of the possibility of full-time or overtime work (this is similar to the approach 
taken by the Congressional Budget Office, see for example Harris and Mok, 2015). As argued by Feldstein 
(2000), concentrating only on hours worked has some practical and conceptual limitations. Data on hours 
worked might be imprecisely recalled and thus misreported by survey respondents. It can also miss effort 
and work intensity, or career concerns. For example, more effort might lead to a faster career development, 
higher wages and thus income, without necessarily observing higher hours worked. And unlike for hours 
worked for primary earners, there is evidence of a positive though moderate response to marginal tax rates 
(for example, Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez et al. 2012; or Kiss and Mosberger, 2015 and Benczúr et al., 2013 
for Hungary). At the same time, some caution is warranted when interpreting taxable income elasticities as 
labour supply elasticities, since they may also reflect tax evasion. Section 2.2 discusses the relevance of the 
tax evasion margin for our Hungarian estimates. 
Taxable income elasticity estimations typically require administrative tax data. These are less easily 
accessible than household budget surveys, and the two data sources cannot be merged because of data 
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protection issues. We resolve this limitation by adopting a two-step approach. The first step is the extensive 
margin adjustment, which is interpreted as a shift in the probability of a full time job (part-time work is very 
limited in Hungary, as mentioned in Galuščák and Kátay, 2017). The intensive margin, on the other hand, 
represents work effort, conditional on working. This way, a shock to the aggregate effective labour supply 
may come from intensive adjustment if, with all employment probabilities held constant, some individuals 
change their work effort (conditional on employment) or extensive adjustment if, work effort held constant, 
the probability of work increases for some individuals.  
Linking micro and macro models for policy analysis also fits into recent trends in microsimulation modelling. 
These approaches typically use Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models to take account of the 
general-equilibrium effects (see Davies, 2009, for a recent survey). CGE models are complex tools allowing 
the researcher to model the consumption and labour supply behaviour of one or more representative 
households, and model the complex interrelations of wages and prices in several sectors of the economy. 
In most cases, the linked CGE-microsimulation method is used to assess the effects of trade opening, or 
other large macroeconomic shocks, on the income distribution in developing countries.  
There is by now a growing number of applications of micro-macro models to questions of tax policy: an 
early example is Slemrod (1985), who focused on the incidence and the effects on portfolio choice of a 
hypothetical flat-rate income tax in the US. Early work used the linked CGE-microsimulation approach to 
model the effects of corporate taxation (Tongeren, 1994; Plumb, 2001).  
There are a few papers that do not employ a CGE framework to close the model. Cameron and Ezzeddin 
(2000) use a regional input-output model to assess indirect effects of regional and federal tax and transfer 
policies in Canada, while Lattarulo et al. (2003) use a social-accounting-matrix based multiplier approach to 
model the income distribution of the Italian region of Tuscany. In both of these studies, the micro and the 
macro, models are fully integrated. 
Closest to our focus are recent works on the interactions of labour supply and general-equilibrium 
feedbacks. Aaberge et al. (2004) analyse how endogenous labour supply interacts with long-term fiscal 
sustainability in Norway; Arntz et al. (2008) use such an approach to evaluate a hypothetical welfare reform 
in Germany; while Fuest et al. (2008) and Peichl (2009) simulate the effects of a hypothetical German flat-
tax reform. Jongen et al. (2014) develop a detailed behavioural microsimulation tool for analysing Dutch tax 
and benefit reforms.  
Barrios et al. (2016) extend the EUROMOD model with a behavioural and macroeconomic part, and apply it 
to various policy changes in Italy, Belgium and Poland. Ayala and Paniagua (2016) adopts a similar approach 
(with no macroeconomic part) to Spain.  
Our approach differs from these studies by using a fully integrated, simple, single-sector macro model to 
calculate general-equilibrium effects. It has been first outlined in Benczúr et al. (2011), then further 
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developed in Benczúr, Kátay and Kiss (2012), and eventually extended to the Czech Republic (Galuščák and 
Kátay, 2017) and Slovakia (Horváth et al., 2017). Besides contributing to the scant literature on linked micro-
macro modelling in transition economies,5 our approach to micro-macro modelling keeps the 
macroeconomic model parsimonious and computationally easy.  
In a closely related yet markedly different approach, Barrios et al. (2016) establish a link between the 
EUROMOD microsimulation model and QUEST, the European Commission’s DSGE modelling suit. In their 
approach, however, integration is incomplete. The micro model first guides the calibration of and the shock 
entered into the DSGE model. The implied evolution of wages and employment is then fed back to 
microsimulation to calculate the distributional and fiscal impacts, but the labour supply response is not 
reassessed. 
The parsimony of our macro model has the advantage that it is easy to see which assumptions and 
parameters are responsible for the nature of general-equilibrium feedback effects. This is in sharp contrasts 
with the complexity of most CGE or DSGE models. The parsimony of the macro model also minimizes 
potential theoretical and practical inconsistencies between the micro and macro models, without the need 
for aggregating heterogeneous agents into a representative one (as proposed by Magnani and Mercenier, 
2009; and also adopted by Barrios et al., 2016). Finally, it allows both models to be fully integrated: 
information is not restricted to flow only one way (either from the macro model to the microsimulation in 
a ‘top-down’ approach, or the other way round in a ‘bottom-up’ approach). The modules are repeatedly 
run in an automatic iterative process until they reach full convergence.  
The cost of parsimony on the macro side is that shifts among sectors (both in production and in 
consumption) are ignored. We believe that this cost is significantly lower for our application than it may be 
in other cases. The interrelations of various sectors (agriculture, formal, informal) are in the very focus of 
studies on developing countries, especially in the analysis of sector-specific macroeconomic shocks (e.g., 
trade liberalisation in agriculture). In contrast, sector-specific concerns are not central for our focus, which 
is the reaction of labour supply to changes in the tax and transfer system and its repercussions for the whole 
economy. The fact that the Hungarian economy is fully integrated into the European Economic Area 
reinforces the point that a simple small open economy macro model is appropriate. As Davies (2009, p. 60) 
puts it: “In the case of national subregions, or countries embedded in free-trade areas, it can be argued that 
microsimulation may adequately be combined with pure macro models. That is, CGE modelling may not be 
necessary.” 
Using our model, we perform three sets of simulations. The first one explores the impact of personal income 
tax reductions that are identical in cost but different in structure: an across-the-board rate cut, a plain flat 
                                                          
5 In his survey, Davies (2009, p. 60) makes this point: “Currently, several groups of development researchers are putting these two 
approaches [microsimulation and CGE modelling] together, and in some cases adding macroeconomic and financial modelling as 
well. With a few conspicuous exceptions, little such work is being done for the transition economies.” 
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tax, a flat tax with a zero rate at the bottom, and a flat tax with a tax credit scheme at the bottom. The 
second one compares three different tax shift scenarios: a personal income tax cut financed by a corporate 
tax hike, a VAT hike, or a transfer tightening. Finally, the third one evaluates actual Hungarian policy 
measures between 2008 and 2013. 
The results from our hypothetical policy simulations show that while a cut in the marginal tax rate of high-
income individuals may boost output, it does not have a significant employment effect. On the other hand, 
programs like the Employee Tax Credit do have a significant employment effect. An across-the-board 
personal income tax cut financed by a corporate tax hike leads to a very small increase in labour use, but its 
output effect is negative, driven by the elastic response of capital. If a similar personal income tax cut is 
financed by a VAT hike, the employment and GDP effects are positive. Transfer tightening seems very 
effective in boosting employment, since it creates very strong financial incentives for work. It is important 
to keep in mind though that our model abstracts from potentially important features of transfers like the 
impact of unemployment insurance duration on matching efficiency, or an increase in poverty. In actual 
policy considerations, these should also be taken into account. 
Simulating the effects of recent actual policy changes, we find that measures passed in the two years before 
the 2010 elections increase long-run employment and GDP, but there is no significant adjustment at the 
intensive margin of labour supply. In contrast, measures passed since 2010 produce a large gain at the 
intensive margin, but employment is expected to increase only due to cuts in the unemployment benefit. 
Both policy packages are found to substantially increase income inequality in the long run (the contribution 
of the changes after 2010 is about four times that of the changes before 2010). The cumulative change has 
the potential to place Hungary at the median of the EU-27, in a marked change from its original ranking as 
the country with the 6th most equal income distribution. 
It is important to note that we find quantitatively large behavioural responses and fiscal feedbacks. For 
example, different personal income tax cut scenarios with a static revenue cost of 0.3% of GDP can lead to 
a 0.3-3.2% increase of GDP. At the same time, the static fiscal cost of such packages can turn to a sizable 
gain in the long run, ranging up to 0.6% of GDP. This is not because of particularly large labour supply 
elasticities. Instead, it is partly because of the high starting level of non-linearity in the Hungarian tax system, 
and partly because the reforms we consider are not marginal. The 2010-13 tax reform, for example, has cut 
the top marginal tax rate from 40 to 20%. The hypothetical reform scenarios were also motivated by actual 
tax reform debates in 2008-09.6 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give a detailed description of the 
principles of the model: we describe the data, our approach to modelling labour supply adjustment, and 
the main elements and some limitations of the small macro model in which the microsimulation is 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Kátay (2009), available only in Hungarian. 
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embedded. Section 3 presents results of the simulations, followed by various robustness checks in Section 
4. The final section offers some concluding remarks. Some details are presented in the Appendix. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
2.1. Data 
The microsimulation model runs on the 2008 wave of the Household Budget Survey (HBS) compiled by 
Hungary’s Central Statistical Office. Though we have access to more recent waves as well, we decided to 
stick to the last pre-crisis year, where the assumption of the economy being ‘in steady state’ is more 
plausible. The data set provides detailed information on nearly 20,000 individuals (including information on 
their labour market status and income) living in nearly 8,000 households. Our analysis relies strongly on 
household characteristics when modelling labour supply and eligibility for social transfers. For this reason, 
we could not base our analysis on tax return data, since these do not include information about household 
characteristics (not even the number of children).  
The HBS, however, comes with a weakness. While it is a representative survey of households living in 
Hungary along many dimensions, the income distribution of individuals observed in the data set does not 
exactly match the official tax data. As is reportedly typical of survey data, the top of the income distribution 
is underrepresented. A possible solution to this problem is the matching of datasets: a multiple matching 
between individual tax returns and individuals observed in the survey is a method often used to resolve this 
problem. Our approach to correct the wage distribution is different but has a very similar effect. Before the 
actual microsimulation, we include a wage-correction stage. This is done by comparing, percentile for 
percentile, the average gross wage income of individuals in the HBS and in tax return data for 2008. For 
most of the income distribution, the differences between both data sets are not large (less than 10%). The 
difference, however, grows bigger in the top 10% of the income distribution, reaching almost 50% in the 
top percentile. Thus, in the top part of the distribution we multiply the wage income of individuals in the 
HBS by a percentile-specific factor to match the wage income distribution in the tax return data. (The 
method is robust to the choice of the lowest percentile included in the correction; it is important, however, 
that the top 30 percentiles are included.) This step makes the static fiscal assessments based on our 
microsimulation model reliable.  
2.2. Microsimulation 
The behavioural microsimulation model takes into account two types of behavioural adjustment on the 
individual level: labour supply response at the intensive and extensive margin. Labour supply response at 
the intensive margin means that individuals change their work intensity (hours, work effort, etc.) after a 
change in their marginal or average tax rate. The general view is that such a behavioural response exists for 
high-income earners (mostly in response to marginal rate changes) but less in the lower ranges of the 
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income distribution. Labour supply response at the extensive margin means that an individual exits the 
labour force if the financial gains to market work decrease (and vice versa). The general view is that this 
type of behavioural adjustment is more significant in the case of secondary earners, low-income earners, 
women with children, young workers and the elderly. For an overview of such findings, see, e.g., Meghir 
and Phillips 2010. 
In this paper, the labour supply response at the intensive margin is calibrated based on estimations by Kiss 
and Mosberger (2015) of the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the tax rates. They employ 
administrative tax data and estimate the compensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to the 
marginal net-of-tax rate to be approximately 0.2 for high earners. We apply this elasticity to the top fifth of 
wage earners; lower-income households are assumed to have no labour supply response at the intensive 
margin (Bakos et al., 2008 and its updated estimates reported in Benczúr et al., 2013 provide estimations 
that support this type of dependence of the elasticity on income). Robustness of the results with respect to 
these elasticities is investigated in Section 4.  
A note is in order about the interpretation of the taxable-income elasticity as labour-supply response. Some 
studies (especially in the U.S.) found that part of the response in taxable income to taxation is due to tax 
optimisation (through itemised deductions) and has, therefore, little to do with additional real economic 
activity. For Hungary, however, there are good reasons to view the taxable income elasticity as labour-
supply response. First, itemised cost deductions are negligible in the Hungarian personal income tax system. 
Correspondingly, the existing estimations on Hungarian data are lower than taxable-income elasticities 
estimated in the US. Second, Kiss and Mosberger (2015) present additional indirect evidence that supports 
this interpretation. Firstly, their estimated elasticity does not differ significantly between those individuals 
who have wage income only and those who have multiple sources of income (dividend, entrepreneurial 
income, etc.). Plausibly, the former group has less opportunity for tax avoidance and evasion. Secondly, 
they find no support for income shifting in the tax-reform episode they investigate.  
The labour supply response at the extensive margin is calibrated based on the estimations of Galuščák and 
Kátay (2017). They pool eleven consecutive waves of the HBS to estimate a standard discrete choice 
structural labour supply model for Hungary (and also for the Czech Republic). In this framework, originally 
proposed by van Soest (1995), individuals choose between a discrete set of hours of work yielding different 
utilities. As part-time work is relatively rare in Hungary (less than 5% before the crisis), only two labour-
market states are considered: full time work (or seeking full time work) and inactive. Assuming that the 
utility 𝑈𝑖𝑗  that individual i derives from choosing full-time work (j=1) or inactivity (j=0) is represented by a 
random utility model of the form 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗, where 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is a deterministic term and 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is an i.i.d. type I 
extreme value distributed random term, the probability of being economically active is given by: 
    1001111, ,,1,,,,1, iiiiiiji ZcVZlcVPP   . 
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Here 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is conditional on the individual’s net disposable income if he works full time (𝑐𝑖1) or if he stays out 
of the labour force (𝑐𝑖0), leisure (1 − 𝑙1, with total time endowment normalised to 1), a vector of individual 
characteristics 𝑍𝑖  and preference parameters 𝜃, and fixed costs of work 1 . With only two labour market 
states, the participation decision is a simple logit model that can be estimated using standard maximum 
likelihood techniques. 
The study finds that the labour supply response at the extensive margin is strongest for low-wage groups 
and married women. Table A1 reports the conditional marginal effects relevant for the present study.7 
To assess the order of magnitudes of these extensive margin effects, it is instructive to compare them to 
the ‘consensus’ 0.25 value of aggregate (steady state) net wage elasticity reported by Chetty et al. (2013). 
The net wage marginal effects in Table A1 are somewhat larger, but they are not directly comparable: the 
reported marginal effects indicate the effect of one percent increase in net wage on the probability of being 
active (or on the participation rate) in percentage points, as opposed to the elasticity measures in Chetty et 
al. (2012) indicating the percentage change in employment to the same shock. To produce the equivalent 
of the exercise by Chetty et al. (2012), one needs to increase the net wage of all individuals by 1% and look 
at its employment or participation effect. The resulting 0.28% increase in participation implies an elasticity 
of 0.28, quite in line with the consensus value. 
To further study the impact of transfer reforms on the extensive margin, we report the result of an 
additional labour supply simulation exercise. We simulate the effects of the cut in maternity benefit 
comparable to the one that took place in 1995. Köllő (2009) found a positive though often insignificant 
effect of this measure on the activity of mothers with infants, while Szabó-Morvai (2013) found a negative 
though delayed effect of the reversal of the reform. Our estimates imply a 0.09% increase in total 
employment, which corresponds to a roughly 1.02% increase in employment of the target group (women 
with children).8 This is consistent with a positive but statistically not always significant treatment effect. 
The labour-supply response at the extensive margin is implemented in the microsimulation the following 
way. Every individual of working age is assigned an individual-specific baseline activity probability based on 
the underlying logit estimates (and not on some group-specific conditional marginal effect) of Galuščák and 
Kátay (2017). The labour-supply response at the extensive margin is modelled as an adjustment of this 
probability after any change to the tax and transfer system. This procedure means that we must simulate, 
                                                          
7 Galuščák and Kátay (2017) also report results for a “reduced form” or “gains-to-work model”, in which the probability of being 
active depends on the net income an individual can achieve when out of work and the “financial gains to work”, i.e. the change in 
disposable income due to taking up a full-time job (which equals the net wage minus lost transfers). Such an approach also requires 
an integrated microsimulation tool, to assess the counterfactual values of income: the transfers that the currently active would get 
if they quit or lose their job, and the transfers the currently inactive would lose if they took up work. The estimated elasticities for 
this model are very similar to those obtained with the standard structural model. We performed all simulations presented in this 
paper using this alternative labour supply model. The simulation results are very close to our baseline findings. For the sake of 
brevity, these results are not presented in the paper, but are available from the authors upon request.  
8 According to 2008 values in our database, total employment is 4,080,525. A 0.09% increase adds 3,672 to the employed 
population, which is 1.02% of all the mothers with infants (a group of about 360,000). 
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for every working individual, what transfers they would receive if they did not work and, for every inactive 
individual, how much extra income (net of taxes and including potentially lower transfers) they would earn 
if they did choose to work (gains to work). Aggregate effective employment of the economy is then equal 
to the sum of (potential) gross hourly wages of all individuals weighted by their employment probability. 
This latter is measured as individuals’ participation probabilities minus their group-specific unemployment 
probabilities conditional of being active. This implicitly assumes that labour is homogenous, and relative 
wages reflect relative productivities. 
This formulation of the extensive margin means that the intensive response is reinterpreted as well: it 
represents work effort, conditional on working. In sum, a shock to the aggregate effective labour supply 
may come from intensive adjustment if, with all employment probabilities held constant, some individuals 
change their work effort (conditional on employment) or extensive adjustment if, work effort held constant, 
the probability of work increases for some individuals. Our model is programmed in a way that extensive 
and intensive adjustment can be switched on or off independently from each other.  
The microsimulation proceeds in the following steps: (1) given the changes in the tax and transfer system, 
a static microsimulation is conducted first.9 It calculates how much each individual gains (or loses) as a 
consequence of the changes. It also calculates the changes in the marginal and average effective tax rates 
(relevant for the intensive-margin response), the gains to work and the hypothetical amount of transfers 
one would get at zero hours worked (relevant for the extensive-margin response). (2) These updated 
measures are fed back to the participation logit estimation (yielding a change in the individuals’ probability 
of being active) and to the intensive-margin response (effective hours worked conditional on being 
employed). Summing up over individual changes in labour supply, the aggregate labour supply shock is 
obtained. (3) This is fed into the macro model, which calculates general-equilibrium effects on wages and 
the capital stock. (4) Based on the general-equilibrium change of the wage level, the microsimulation is 
repeated. This iterative process is repeated until convergence; that is, until the general equilibrium of the 
economy is consistent with the reform-induced labour supply shock. 
2.3. General equilibrium 
The general-equilibrium macro model is a long-run model of a small open economy. Thus, capital supply is 
almost perfectly elastic. Capital and labour are paid their marginal products, according to a constant-
returns-to-scale production function. This minimalistic, very general structure makes the model tractable, 
transparent, nesting the steady state of many complex DSGE models as well. In the following, we sketch the 
main ingredients of the model, with further details presented in the Appendix. Since the labour supply shock 
comes from microsimulation and we are not interested in the change in sectoral consumption patterns, the 
general-equilibrium model does not detail the household side.  
                                                          
9 Our static microsimulation module partly builds on a tax-benefit model created by Benedek, Elek and Szabó (2009). 
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The production function of the representative firm exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES).10 The 
profit-maximisation problem of firms can be formulated as:11  
max(𝛼𝐾𝛽 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝛽)
1
𝛽(1 − 𝜏𝑠) − 𝑤(1 + 𝜏𝑊)𝐿 −
𝑟
1 − 𝜏𝐾
𝐾. 
Here, 𝜏𝑠 is the effective tax rate on sales (representing, in the baseline, the effects of the local business tax), 
𝑤 is the gross wage, 𝜏𝑊 is the rate of employer-side social security contributions (equivalent to a payroll 
tax), 𝜏𝐾 is the effective tax rate on capital and 
𝑟
1−𝜏𝐾
 is the net user cost of capital.  
The model is closed by the equation that determines the aggregate supply of capital. Capital is provided by 
an international capital market. Its supply is modelled in a reduced form: ?̂? = 𝜂?̂?, where η is the elasticity 
of capital supply K with respect to the after-tax rate of return r (and 𝑥 denotes the percentage change of 
variable 𝑥).  
To interpret the comparative statics implied by this stylized macro model, let us first look at the case of 
perfectly elastic capital supply (𝜂 = ∞). In this case, the domestic rate of return is pinned down by the 
international rate and is thus constant (?̂? = 0). The capital-labour ratio must also stay constant which, in 
turn, implies that wages will also stay constant (perfectly elastic labour demand). We thus get the usual 
result that with perfectly elastic capital supply the capital stock adjusts to shocks, so that the capital-labour 
ratio and factor prices can return to their equilibrium values. For example, if there is a positive labour-supply 
shock following a tax cut, capital accumulation will follow in identical proportion, so that a new equilibrium 
is reached with an unchanged capital-labour ratio. 
If capital is calibrated to be imperfectly elastic (which will be the case in our baseline), wages will decrease 
and the return on capital will increase somewhat after an increase in aggregate labour supply. While capital 
accumulation will mitigate these effects, it will not neutralise them completely. 
The model is calibrated using data from national accounts, fiscal statistics and previous estimations (Kátay 
and Wolf, 2004 in particular). The Appendix contains all the details of the procedure. 
2.4. Limitations 
Based on a limited set of ingredients (most importantly the estimated behavioural elasticities and the small-
open economy macro framework), the model is able to give an assessment of the long-term effects of 
changes of the tax and transfer system to the macroeconomy and the government budget. However, to 
ensure its tractability and transparency, one has to accept some simplifications. 
                                                          
10 Previous estimations of factor demand and the substitutability between labour and capital rejected that the Cobb-Douglas 
production function can be used. See Kátay and Wolf (2004) for an estimation of the demand for capital.  
11 We write the firm’s problem in net terms, so it does not contain the value-added tax (VAT). The VAT is, however, included in the 
net wage entering the labour supply decision. 
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(1) The model is suitable for comparative statics exercises. The dynamics of the adjustment path from 
pre-reform to post-reform steady state equilibrium is not modelled. 
(2) Since the model is supply-driven, the consumption-savings decision of households is not modelled. 
Economic growth is determined by the supply of labour and capital. The consumption decision 
affects our results in only one way: it affects the fiscal effects through the VAT. Our simplified 
assumption that all disposable income is consumed by households admittedly results in the (short-
run) overestimation of the VAT effect of policy measures.  
(3) The model is not closed on the side of government. Budget balance is not enforced either directly 
or by an assumption that higher debt results in higher interest rates paid on government debt. This 
simplification is innocuous if the policy measures analysed are approximately budget neutral or 
small in magnitude; or the objective is to perform a technical projection (no other policy change). 
Otherwise, the macroeconomic effects estimated by the model are overly optimistic in the case of 
measures that weaken the position of the government budget, and vice versa.  
(4) The search-and-matching mechanisms on the labour market are not modelled explicitly. If a policy 
measure changes the equilibrium unemployment rate of any demographic or skill group, the model 
will not take this into account. It might be, for instance, that shortened eligibility for unemployment 
benefits, in addition to strengthening job-search incentives, reduces the success rate and average 
quality of matches between job openings and the unemployed. In this case the long-run 
employment and the output effect of the transfer cut will be overestimated by the model. Horváth 
et al. (2017) extends a similar modelling framework with a search and matching block, and estimates 
the model for Slovakia. Overall, their results are not affected strongly by the incorporation of a job 
search mechanism.  
3. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We present results from three sets of simulations. First, we analyse four different versions of a personal 
income tax (PIT) cut. Second, we analyse three complex hypothetical policy packages that are approximately 
revenue neutral in the absence of behavioural responses. Third, we analyse actual changes of the tax and 
transfer system between 2008 and 2013. In this latter case, we complement the analysis by simulating the 
long-run value of certain inequality measures before and after the reforms, and also identify winners and 
losers of reforms by income quintiles.  
Tables 1 to 3 in this section contain two main panels (Table 3 has an additional one, showing distributional 
effects). The first panel shows the macroeconomic effects: figures are to be interpreted as percentage 
changes of macroeconomic variables in levels as compared to the scenario with no change in legislation. For 
example, Table 1 indicates that an ‘across-the-board’ tax cut would increase the level of long-run GDP by 
0.37%.  
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The second panel in each table presents the fiscal effects: the unit of these figures is billion Hungarian forints 
(HUF) at 2008 prices. To facilitate the interpretation of these figures we note that, on average, 1 EUR was 
equivalent to about HUF 270 during the period 2008-2011. Therefore, a tax package that costs HUF 95 billion 
is the equivalent of about EUR 0.35 billion (or about 0.35% of Hungary’s GDP in 2008). 
The tables below show the static and dynamic effects of various policy packages. The static effect is 
calculated before the labour supply reaction of individuals (or any macroeconomic adjustment) takes place. 
It is however assumed that additional disposable income is consumed by households: static fiscal effects 
therefore include an indirect VAT effect. While this is a technical assumption that is plausible in the long 
run, for realistic short-run fiscal assessments the VAT effect has to be discounted. Dynamic effects include 
all the adjustments: a labour supply response of individuals at the intensive and extensive margins and 
general-equilibrium macroeconomic effects.  
Table 1 shows the static and dynamic effects of three scenarios in which PIT revenues decrease by about 
HUF 95 billion (or 0.35% of GDP) before behavioural changes. All three scenarios are defined as changes 
relative to the 2008 PIT system. In 2008, there were three tax brackets in the Hungarian PIT. The lower rate 
was 18% and applied to income up to approximately the average yearly income; a rate of 36% applied to 
income above that up to the pension contribution ceiling; and a rate of 40% applied to income above that. 
Besides the PIT, individuals paid social security contributions at a rate of 17% up to the pension contribution 
ceiling and 7.5% above that. In 2008 the employee tax credit (ETC; in Hungarian: adójóváírás) reduced the 
PIT liability of individuals earning the monthly minimum wage (HUF 69,000 ≈ EUR 250) to almost zero. The 
ETC was phased out at a rate of 9% around the average yearly income. 
In the first scenario of Table 1 (‘across-the-board PIT cut’), all three PIT rates are reduced by 1 percentage 
point. In the second scenario, an entirely flat tax system with a 20.1% rate is introduced. In the third 
scenario, a 0% tax rate applies to income up to the minimum wage, and a rate of 31% to income above that 
(in this scenario the ETC is eliminated). In the fourth scenario, a single basic tax rate applies to all taxpayers 
(26.2%), but there is an ETC that makes the minimum wage PIT-free and is phased out roughly similarly to 
the actual 2008 ETC. The parameters of the scenarios were adjusted so that all four have a direct fiscal cost 
(not counting the indirect VAT effect) of about HUF 95 billion (the parameters of the PIT scenarios are 
summarised in Table A2 of the Appendix). 
Table 1 shows that different ways of reducing the PIT burden have starkly different aggregate effects. It 
immediately implies that inserting a change in an economy-wide average tax rate (tax revenues per tax 
base) into a standard macro model would be highly misleading. In terms of the employment effect, it is only 
positive in the first scenario, while it is most negative in the plain flat-rate scenario.12 This means that those 
tax reforms will have a positive employment effect that keep the average tax rate low for low earners. The 
most significant employment gain is observed in the case of the ‘across-the-board’ tax cut (a gain of 0.27%), 
                                                          
12 For a larger tax rate reduction package, the employment effects would turn positive but their ranking would remain similar. 
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since in this scenario the average (and marginal) tax rate is lowest for low-income earners above the 
minimum wage, influencing their financial gains to work positively. The finding that employment gains 
depend mostly on the average tax burden of low incomes is consistent with the fact that in Hungary, as in 
most countries, inactivity is concentrated among the low-skilled groups, thus their incentives for 
participation matters most for employment. 
Table 1. Personal income tax scenarios 
  
Across-the-board 
PIT cut 
Flat tax                  
(20.1%) 
2 tax rates                   
(0% + 32%) 
1 tax rate (26.2%)          
+ tax credit 
  Macroeconomic impact (%) 
Effective labour 0.39 3.38 1.00 1.55 
Employment 0.27 -0.33 -0.19 -0.17 
Capital stock 0.32 2.76 0.82 1.25 
GDP 0.37 3.16 0.94 1.44 
Average gross wage -0.04 -0.26 -0.07 -0.13 
Disposable income 1.25 3.39 1.67 2.03 
  Fiscal impact (Billion HUF) 
  static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic 
Personal income tax -94.2 -86.8 -102.1 -47.5 -98.7 -71 -96.5 -63.7 
Employee 
contributions 
0 4 0 35.2 0 10 0 14.8 
Employer contributions 0 9.9 0 86.4 0 25.7 0 40 
Taxes on consumption 17.1 20.1 19.8 54.8 17.9 27 17.7 32.9 
Taxes on capital 0 2.3 0 20.2 0 6 0 9.2 
Taxes on sales 0 1.7 0 14.7 0 4.4 0 6.7 
Transfers 0 4 -0.3 -1.3 0 -3.4 0 -2.4 
Change of budget 
balance 
-77.1 -44.8 -82.6 162.5 -80.8 -1.3 -78.8 37.5 
Note: The upper panel of the table shows percentage changes of macroeconomic variables in levels. The bottom panel shows 
fiscal effects in HUF billion expressed in 2008 prices. (Positive numbers indicate an improvement of the government balance. In 
2008, nominal GDP was HUF 26,545 billion. During the period 2008-2011 the exchange rate was EUR 1 ≈ HUF 270.) Static effects 
are short-run, immediate effects with no behavioural adjustment, but with all extra income consumed. Dynamic effects include 
labour supply reaction of individuals as well as long-run, general-equilibrium macroeconomic effects. The VAT estimate is based 
on a simplifying assumption. 
The ranking of the four scenarios is very different with respect to the incentives of top earners. Effective 
marginal tax rates were relatively high in Hungary in 2008 and a one-percentage point across-the-board tax 
cut of the first scenario does little to change that: the 0.39% increase of effective labour comes almost 
exclusively from the adjustment at the extensive margin. In contrast, in the other three scenarios individuals 
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in the top 20% of the income distribution increase their labour intensity so that aggregate effective labour 
increases by 3.38% (flat-tax scenario), 1% (two-rate scenario) and 1.55% (single-rate scenario with ETC).  
Since the only macroeconomic shock here is the labour supply shock, GDP and the capital stock adjusts 
almost perfectly in proportion to the effective labour supply. This improves public finances in the long run 
relative to the static effect (as can be seen in the bottom panel of Table 1).  
These results illustrate that the ranking of scenarios depends on the criteria used. While an across-the-
board tax cut has the highest employment effect (since, unlike the three other scenarios, it decreases the 
tax burden of low- and middle income individuals), the scenario with a flat tax performs best in terms of 
GDP. The across-the-board tax cut comes in last according to this criterion. The two-rate system without 
ETC is dominated by the single-rate system with ETC in every aspect. Both the two-rate system and the ETC 
keep the average tax rate zero at the minimum wage, but the ETC is less costly. This relative budget surplus 
can be used for lowering marginal tax rates for high earners, which creates additional incentives at the 
intensive margin and therefore stimulate the economy. 
Table 2 shows three scenarios that are approximately revenue neutral in their direct static effect. Each 
scenario is the combination of two measures: one that costs about HUF 95 billion and another that improves 
the government balance by about the same amount. All scenarios are hypothetical but are similar to policies 
proposed or enacted in Hungary in recent years. In the first scenario we introduce the across-the-board PIT 
cut (as analysed above) and balance the budget by increasing the effective tax rate on capital earnings 
(equivalent to an increase of the corporate income tax, CIT). In the second scenario, we introduce the same 
across-the-board PIT cut and finance it by an increase in the VAT.13 In the third scenario, the labour tax cut 
is financed by a roughly 33% overall cut in transfer payments.14  
In the first scenario, the employment gain of the PIT cut is neutralised by the increase in the effective tax 
rate on capital. The overall effect on GDP is negative which makes the government balance deteriorate 
through the dynamic effects. This is a reflection of the fact that in this long-run open-economy model the 
capital stock adjusts very sensitively to the rate of return on capital. 
The second scenario shows that the positive effect of a PIT cut more than counterbalances the negative 
effect of a comparable VAT increase. Although disposable income declines significantly, the overall effect 
of a VAT increase is rather limited (compare the first column of Table 1 to the second column of Table 2). 
Most of the adjustment takes place at the intensive margin; the employment rate remains almost the same. 
Unlike PIT, the VAT also affects non-taxable benefits and other non-labour income, i.e. the purchasing 
                                                          
13 As discussed already in the context of Table 1, the static revenue effect of this scenario includes the increase in VAT revenues due 
to the PIT cut (HUF 17.1 billion, like in the previous scenario). The direct VAT revenue increase is thus 115.7-17.1=98,6 billion, indeed 
just balancing the cost of the PIT cut. 
14 All transfer payments (maternity, unemployment and social support) are decreased by 33%, including their minimum and 
maximum amounts. Its gross effect is HUF 108.3 billion, while the net fiscal effect is HUF 94.3 billion (including decreased employee 
contribution revenue on transfer payments). 
  17 
power of non-employed individuals. As a consequence, the negative substitution effect of a VAT increase is 
at least partly counterbalanced by a positive income effect. 
 
Table 2: Tax shift scenarios with a neutral direct fiscal effect 
  
Capital tax increase 
+ labour tax cut 
VAT increase + 
labour tax cut 
Transfer decrease 
+ labour tax cut 
  Macroeconomic impact (%) 
Effective labour 0.06 0.28 1.58 
Employment 0.08 0.24 2.01 
Capital stock -2.82 0.21 1.31 
GDP -0.95 0.26 1.49 
Average gross wage -1.27 -0.03 -0.12 
Disposable income 0.38 -0.17 0.84 
  Fiscal impact (Billion HUF) 
  static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic 
Personal income tax -94.2 -130.9 -94.2 -89.6 -94.5 -76.7 
Employee contributions 0 -14.9 0 2.8 -14 1.8 
Employer contributions 0 -32.9 0 7.1 0 39.4 
Taxes on consumption 17.1 6.1 115.7 117.9 0.1 13.6 
Taxes on capital 93.6 80.3 0 1.6 0 9.5 
Taxes on sales 0 -4.4 0 1.2 0 6.9 
Transfers 0 1.3 0 3.5 108.3 131.3 
Change of budget balance 16.5 -95.4 21.5 44.5 -0.1 125.8 
Note: The upper panel of the table shows percentage changes of macroeconomic variables in levels. The bottom 
panel shows fiscal effects in HUF billion expressed in 2008 prices. (Positive numbers indicate an improvement of 
the government balance. In 2008, nominal GDP was HUF 26,545 billion, while during the period 2008-2011 the 
exchange rate was EUR 1 ≈ HUF 270.) Static effects are short-run, immediate effects with no behavioural 
adjustment, but with all extra income consumed. Dynamic effects include labour supply reaction of individuals as 
well as long-run, general-equilibrium macroeconomic effects. The VAT estimate is based on a simplifying 
assumption. 
In the third scenario, the model predicts that restricting transfer payments increases employment by 1.74% 
(compare the third column of Table 2 to the first column of Table 1), and it also boosts GDP considerably. 
However, it is important to note that transfer payments (unemployment benefits in particular) may have 
important effects that are not incorporated in our model. For example, the shortening of the unemployment 
benefit period will make the individuals want to find a job earlier and therefore they increase their labour 
supply, but a shorter job-search period may also impair the quality of employee-employer matches. 
Furthermore, such a policy may have adverse effects on income inequality and poverty. 
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In the last set of policy packages analysed, Table 3 shows the simulated effects of changes to the tax and 
transfer system that actually took place from 2008 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2013.15 As elections were held 
in 2010, these columns correspond to changes passed by the Socialist majority in the legislature before the 
elections and the Conservative majority after the elections.  
During the period from 2008 to 2010, there were some changes in the transfer system (both the so-called 
thirteenth-month pension payments and sick leave payments were cut) but these do not enter into our 
simulations as they do not have a significant effect on the labour supply choice of individuals. At the same 
time, the following tax policy changes took place. The VAT was increased from 20% to 25% (which translates 
in our model to an increase of the effective consumption tax rate from 18.2% to 19.4%), partially paying for 
a five-percentage-point cut in employer contributions (from 32% to 27%). At the same time, PIT rates were 
adjusted so that middle-income taxpayers got a notable tax relief. In particular, the three tax brackets were 
consolidated into two, with the upper limit of the lowest tax bracket increased significantly. The rates 
increased slightly in the meantime: the lower tax rate became 21.6% (instead of 18%) while the upper tax 
rate 40.6% (instead of 36% and 40%).  
During the period 2010 to 2013, the most important change affecting the transfer system was the 
shortening of the maximum period of unemployment benefits from 12 months to 3 months. The changes 
to the tax system included a radical cut in the top PIT rate (from 40.6% to 20.3%), a large expansion of the 
child tax credit, a 1.5 percentage point increase in the employee contributions and a further increase of the 
VAT to 27% as well as significant increases in excise taxes (taken into account, similarly to the VAT, in the 
effective tax rate on consumption). The ETC was eliminated in 2012, to be replaced by an employer-
contribution relief for young, old and unskilled employees starting in 2013. At the same time, a CIT cut took 
place, counterbalanced by extraordinary (‘crisis’) taxes on the banking and telecommunication sectors as 
well as large retail companies. We fed these changes into the model by changing the effective tax rate on 
capital from 7.3% to 6.2%. In calculating this, we took into account only that part of the extraordinary taxes 
that are to be made permanent, based on the stated intentions of the government (i.e., about one-third of 
the bank tax). A further sectoral tax, passed into law in 2012, is to be levied on bank transactions starting 
from 2013. We accounted the bank transaction tax partly as a tax on consumption, partly on sales as it is 
paid by businesses, too. Altogether, we estimate that the effective tax rate on consumption increases from 
19.4% in 2010 to 23.2% in 2013; while the effective tax rate on sales increases from 1.65% in 2010 to 2.28% 
in 2013. The exact parameters used in the simulations of actual changes between 2008 and 2013 are 
summarised in Table A3 of the Appendix.  
In both periods 2008-2010 and 2010-2013, Parliament enacted legislation that restricted retirement. In 
2009, the regular retirement age was increased from 62 to 65 (the transition occurring between 2014 and 
                                                          
15 The 2013 scenario takes into account measures announced until August 2012.  
  19 
2022). A law passed in 2011 restricts the possibilities of retiring before the official retirement age with some 
occupational exceptions (although rules became stricter even for the occupational groups with a special 
treatment). These reforms are, however, difficult to incorporate into our modelling framework, so we 
decided not to quantify their effects. 
Table 3 shows that while both periods saw a net cut in PIT and employer contributions, and an increase in 
the effective consumption tax rate, this was accompanied by different measures in other parts of the tax 
and transfer system. Measures between 2008-2010 had a negative overall static fiscal effect of about HUF 
576 billion (about 2.2% of GDP), although savings not accounted for in our simulations counterbalanced 
these measures to a large extent. In contrast, measures in the period 2010-2013 have an approximately 
neutral static fiscal effect, with cuts in the unemployment benefit, increases of employee contributions and 
taxes on sales and consumption making up for foregone PIT revenue. 
Table 3 also shows that the policy packages of both periods differ in their macroeconomic effect. Mainly 
due to the cut in employer contributions, the changes between 2008 and 2010 increase long-run 
employment by 1.24% and GDP by 0.97%. Since top marginal rates remained unchanged during this period, 
there is less adjustment at the intensive margin. In contrast, the combination of cuts in the CIT, PIT and 
unemployment benefits in the period 2010-2013 are estimated to increase long-run employment by 2.12% 
and the long-run level of GDP by 5.18%. Here, the employment effect is entirely due to the cuts in 
unemployment benefits. Since the PIT cuts are concentrated at high incomes, they increase effective labour 
supply, and thus GDP, but employment to a much smaller degree. The employment effects of the 
elimination of the ETC and the introduction of targeted employer contribution relief roughly cancel out. 
When interpreting the simulated effects of the policy package of the period 2010-2013, we must note that 
there is serious uncertainty about a number of measures including those that are to come into effect only 
in 2013 (especially the targeted employer contribution relief and the bank transactions tax). Also, the 
phasing-out of temporary ‘crisis taxes’ is far from complete, which means that we might underestimate the 
current effective tax rate on capital and its expected future value as perceived by capital owners. 
When analysing the 2008-2013 tax and transfer packages, we also evaluated measures of inequality and 
the incidence of the gains and losses. The inequality measures, resulting from a dynamic simulation, are 
shown in the bottom of Table 3. They correspond to equivalised disposable household income per capita. 
It is important to note that our reported inequality measures for the 2008 baseline are obtained using 
predicted transfers and – for non-employed individuals – wages, to ensure their comparability with the 
simulated values for 2010 and 2013. This leads to an overestimation of the 2008 Gini coefficient (which was 
25.2, according to Eurostat data). 
 
Table 3: Long-run effects of actual changes of the tax and transfer system 
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  2008-2010 2010-2013 
  Macroeconomic impact (%) 
Effective labour 1.01 5.05 
Employment 1.24 2.12 
Capital stock 0.90 5.42 
GDP 0.97 5.18 
Average gross wage 4.45 2.18 
Disposable income 3.60 1.92 
  Fiscal impact (Billion HUF) 
  static dynamic static dynamic 
Personal income tax -309.8 -189.5 -404.4 -312.5 
Employee contributions 134.7 208.9 105.4 211.7 
Employer contributions -522.6 -395.5 -294.9 -151.9 
Taxes on consumption 138.9 194.5 397 502.5 
Taxes on capital 0 6.2 -103 -66.7 
Taxes on sales -24.1 -19.9 168.6 200.1 
Transfers 6.8 23 114.3 129.8 
Change of budget balance -576.1 -172.3 -17 513 
  Impact on income inequality 
  2008 2010 2013 
Gini index 27.18 28.07 32.04 
P90/P10 3.12 3.33 3.78 
P90/P50 1.76 1.84 2.01 
P50/P10 1.78 1.81 1.88 
Note: The upper panel of the table shows percentage changes of macroeconomic variables 
in levels. The middle panel shows fiscal effects in HUF billion expressed in 2008 prices. 
(Positive numbers indicate an improvement of the government balance. In 2008, nominal 
GDP was HUF 26,545 billion, while during the period 2008-2011 the exchange rate was 
EUR 1 ≈ HUF 270.) Static effects are short-run, immediate effects with no behavioural 
adjustment, but with all extra income consumed. Dynamic effects include labour supply 
reaction of individuals as well as long-run, general-equilibrium macroeconomic effects. 
The VAT estimate is based on a simplifying assumption. 
 
Table 3 shows that both sets of tax policy changes increase income inequality: the long-run Gini index is 
estimated to increase by somewhat less than a point (from 27.18 to 28.07, a 3.27% increase) due to the 
changes up to 2010 and by a bit less than four additional points (to 32.04, an additional 14.14% increase) 
due to the changes up to 2013.  
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This is a truly significant increase in inequality. The same cumulative percentage increase in Hungary’s 
original 25.2 Gini coefficient would have taken the country from the sixth lowest position (after Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Denmark) to the median (29.71). The actual 2013 and 2014 Gini 
values were 28.3 and 28.6, both at the eleventh lowest position.  
The other three inequality measures in Table 3 also show growing income inequality but they also help to 
identify which part of the income distribution the change comes from. The measure P50/P10 shows that 
the gap between the median earner and individuals around the 10th percentile of the income distribution 
grows only a little as a consequence of the reforms. There is more significant growth in the gap between 
the 90th percentile and the median. There is an interesting difference between the development of this 
measure and the Gini index. While the increase in the P90/P50 ratio is more concentrated to the second 
period, this applies much more to the increase in the Gini coefficient. This reflects the fact that the 2010-
2013 cut in top marginal tax rates caused an increase in income inequality even within the top 10 percent, 
a development that is not captured by the P90/P50 measure.16  
Another way microsimulation can help us analyse the distributional effects of tax and transfer changes is to 
calculate the average gains and losses of certain types of households in the population. Figure 1 reports the 
static results of such an exercise based on the 2010-2013 policy package (that included a tax cut for high-
income earners, a significant extension of the child tax credit, the elimination of the ETC affecting low and 
middle-income earners, and a cut in the unemployment benefit). We divided households into quintiles 
based on equivalised income (household income corrected for household size and composition according 
to the modified OECD equivalence scale) and asked the following questions: How many individuals live in 
households in a given income quintile who gained (lost) as a consequence of the reforms? How much in 
average annual income did households gain (loose) as a consequence of the reforms? The results presented 
are static: they were calculated without any behavioural response. 
The last column of Figure 1 shows that the 2010-2013 policy package made more individuals worse off than 
better off, and that the winning households gained more than what the losing households lost. In absolute 
numbers, about 4.5 million individuals live in households that were made worse off while about 3.1 million 
individuals live in households that were made better off. The average gain of a household made better off 
is about HUF 444 thousand (about EUR 1640) while the average loss of a household made worse off is about 
HUF 124 thousand (about EUR 450). The average of the change in annual income is slightly positive. 
 
Figure 1: Static simulation of the incidence of actual changes, 2010-2013 
                                                          
16 Our percentile ratios are similar to the ones published by Eurostat for 2008: According to Eurostat data, the P90/P50 ratio was 
1.70 while the P50/P10 was 1.76.  
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Note: Household quintiles defined based on equivalised income 
 
Figure 1 also presents the average gains and losses by quintile. Column 5 shows that only households in the 
top quintile are clear winners of the changes, while the bottom three quintiles suffered an overall income 
loss. The effect on the fourth quintile was approximately neutral: the average of the change in annual 
income is near zero but negative. 
Information about the gains and losses within quintiles reinforces the notion that gains from the tax changes 
are concentrated in the top of the income distribution. There are more than twice as many winners than 
losers in the top quintile, while in each of the bottom four quintiles the losers outnumber the winners by 
far. In addition, winners in the top quintile gained around 12% of their total annual net income, while 
winners in the lower quintiles increased their net income by about 4-5.5%. The fact that there are winners 
and losers in all quintiles reflects another significant element of the 2010-2013 tax changes: a redistribution 
of income from families without children to the ones with children. This redistribution is the effect of the 
extension of the child tax credit (in 2011) and the elimination of the ETC (in 2012).  
The immediate distribution effects shown in Figure 1 are likely to be dampened in the long run by the 
targeted employer contribution relief passed into law in 2012, to the degree that it is passed on to the 
employees in their gross wages. However, this is a dynamic effect that cannot be taken into account in this 
static (‘on-impact’) simulation.  
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4. ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS 
We perform two sets of robustness checks. The first focuses on how the simulated effects of the 2010-2013 
policy package depend on the behavioural labour supply elasticities underlying the analysis. The second 
exercise focuses on the robustness of the results to the calibrated macro parameters.  
Table 4 shows the effects of the 2010-2013 policy package under different behavioural assumptions. In this 
table, each column corresponds to a separate run of the microsimulation model, while the rows correspond 
to the most important macroeconomic and fiscal variables.  
Table 4: Robustness of the simulations to labour supply elasticities: The changes of 2010-2013 
  
Baseline 
No 
behavioural 
change 
(only 
macro) 
Only 
extensive 
response 
Only intensive response 
  
Baseline 
elasticities 
With 
income 
effect 
Higher 
elasticity 
with 
income 
effect 
Effective labour 5.05 0.00 2.00 2.89 0.57 3.73 
Employment 2.12 0.00 2.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital stock 5.42 1.19 2.85 3.64 1.69 4.35 
GDP 5.18 0.42 2.30 3.15 0.96 3.95 
Average gross 
wage 
-0.48 -0.12 -0.27 -0.31 -0.15 -0.37 
Disposable income 1.92 -1.13 0.02 0.69 -0.85 1.17 
Change of budget 
balance 
513 146 294 354 194 417 
Note: Results from dynamic simulations. See the text for parameter values of the alternative intensive-margin elasticities. 
 
The first column of Table 4 repeats the results of the fifth column of Table 3: it shows the simulated effects 
of the 2010-2013 policy package under the baseline behavioural assumptions. In contrast, the second 
column shows the results of the simulation if both margins of individual adjustment are ‘switched off’. Here 
there is no change in labour supply at all (since it is perfectly inelastic); but changes of taxes on corporate 
income, sales and consumption affect the macroeconomic equilibrium.  
In the third column, individual adjustment at the extensive margin is ‘switched on’. The policy package is 
estimated to increase long-term employment by 2.07%, thereby raising GDP by 2.3% and improving the 
dynamic fiscal balance. 
In the last three columns, focus is on the adjustment at the intensive margin: on the one hand, this is a 
controversial issue in the literature (see, for example, the discussion by Meghir and Phillips, 2010); on the 
other hand, the impact of the 2010-2013 tax reform crucially depends on the elasticity of taxable income. 
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In this exercise, adjustment at the extensive margin is ‘switched off’ but adjustment at the intensive margin 
does take place. The first of these uses the ‘baseline elasticity’ as taken from the study of Kiss and Mosberger 
(2015). That study finds that higher-income earners are somewhat responsive to the marginal net-of-tax 
rate; the estimated elasticity is 0.2. In the simulation model this elasticity is applied to the top 20% of 
earners; individuals with lower incomes are assumed not to adjust along the intensive margin. The point 
estimate of the income effect in the study of Kiss and Mosberger is sizable but very imprecisely estimated; 
therefore, the baseline income effect was chosen to be zero.  
The results from this ‘baseline elasticity’ simulation support the view that most of the stimulative effect of 
the 2010-2013 policy package comes from labour supply adjustment at the intensive margin. Due mainly to 
the cuts in the marginal tax rate of high earners, the policy package is estimated to add, under these 
assumptions, 2.73-2.89 percentage points to the level of GDP and to the effective labour supply in the long 
run (compare column 4 to column 2). 
The next column of Table 4 (‘Baseline elasticity plus income effect’) repeats this analysis including a non-
zero income effect. The parameter chosen in the simulation is -0.5 (applied to the top 20% of the income 
distribution); this is the point estimate by Kiss and Mosberger (2015) of the parameter (the elasticity of 
reported income with respect to the average net-of-tax rate). The simulation shows that an income effect 
of this magnitude dampens the stimulative effects of the policy package to about one-sixth: effective labour 
supply and GDP is increase only by 0.54%.  
The last column of Table 4 shows results from a simulation where the elasticities describing the adjustment 
at the intensive margin are taken from the other available Hungarian study by Bakos et al. (2008). For higher 
income earners, they estimated a higher elasticity than Kiss and Mosberger (0.34 instead of 0.2) with an 
income effect of -0.27. In later follow-ups, as indicated by Benczúr et al. (2013), the marginal tax rate 
elasticity was found to be closer to the Kiss and Mosberger results. Nevertheless, it is still a reasonable 
alternative to postulate an even larger substitution effect (also coinciding with the ‘consensus’ intensive 
margin elasticity of Chetty et al., 2012) and a moderately negative income effect which leads to an almost-
zero uncompensated elasticity. We find that the estimated effects of the 2010-2013 policy package with 
these alternative elasticities are similar to, but somewhat higher than, the results estimated with the 
baseline elasticities in column 4. The two parametric differences between the estimations of Bakos et al. 
(2008) and Kiss and Mosberger (2015) have the opposite effect, nearly cancelling out.  
In the second set of robustness checks, we analyse how the simulation results depend on the most relevant 
calibrated macro parameters. Table 5 presents results from three types of alternative simulations against 
the baseline results from column 5 of Table 3. First, the elasticity of capital supply (parameter 𝜂) is modified: 
the corner cases of perfectly elastic capital supply (𝜂 = ∞) and perfectly inelastic capital supply (𝜂 = 0) are 
analysed. Second, the capital income share parameter is modified from the baseline value of 0.35 to 0.3 
and 0.4. Finally, the production-function parameter governing the substitutability between labour and 
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capital (parameter 𝛽) is modified. This parameter is given in our model as 𝛽 =
𝜎−1
𝜎
. While we chose 𝜎 = 0.8 
as our baseline, as a robustness check we ran simulations with 𝜎 = 0.7 and 𝜎 = 0.9.  
Table 5: Robustness to the calibrated macro parameters: The changes of 2010-2013 
  
Baseline 
Capital elasticity 
(instead of 15) 
  
Capital share 
(instead of 0.35) 
  
K-L substitution 
(instead of 0.8) 
  eta = ∞. eta = 0   
rK/Y = 
0.3 
rK/Y = 
0.4 
  
sigma = 
0.7 
sigma = 
0.9 
Effective labour 5.05 5.15 4.56   5.04 5.07   4.76 5.03 
Employment 2.12 2.19 1.78   2.11 2.13   2.14 2.11 
Capital stock 5.42 6.70 0.00   5.28 5.57   5.50 5.24 
GDP 5.18 5.69 2.97   5.11 5.27   5.02 5.10 
Average gross 
wage 
-0.48 0.04 -2.62   -0.55 -0.39   -0.27 -0.56 
Disposable income 1.92 2.35 0.09   1.87 2.00   1.88 1.85 
Note: Results from dynamic simulations.  
 
All three types of changes in the parameters can ultimately be described by how they affect the reaction of 
the capital stock to changes in the marginal return of capital. Table 5 confirms that capital (and thus output, 
wages and effective labour) reacts more sensitively (1) the more elastic the supply of capital is; (2) the higher 
the income share of capital is; and, finally, (3) the more substitutable the factors of production are.  
Looking at the capital-supply elasticity scenarios as compared to the baseline (the first three columns of 
Table 5) we see that our baseline calibration of 𝜂 = 15 is closer to the perfectly elastic case than to the 
perfectly inelastic case. Columns 4 and 5 show that, within a plausible range, the capital-income share 
parameter does not affect results very sensitively. Finally, the last two columns of Table 5 show how the 
results are affected by moving the factor-substitutability parameter. The results show that moving away 
from the extreme Cobb-Douglas case (of 𝛽 = 0) make capital adjust more sensitively to changes in its 
marginal product. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present a simple, tractable yet rich general-equilibrium behavioural microsimulation 
model, designed to assess long-run output, employment, fiscal and distributional consequences of reforms 
to the tax and the transfer system. We estimate and calibrate the model to Hungary, and then we simulate 
three sets of scenarios. First, we analyse four different ways of tax relief in the personal income tax system. 
Second, we analyse three complex hypothetical proposals that are fiscally neutral without behavioural 
change. Last, we analyse actual changes of the tax and transfer system between 2008 and 2013.  
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The results of the first two exercises show that the desirability of different tax policy scenarios depends 
greatly on the criterion used. If the main objective is employment growth, policymakers should keep (or 
decrease) the average tax burden of low incomes as low as possible, since the lower-wage, mostly low-
skilled, groups — where the large part of the inactivity is concentrated in most countries — are the most 
sensitive to change in their financial gains to work. The most efficient way of keeping the average tax rate 
low for low-income earners is the Employee Tax Credit (ETC): similarly to a system with a zero lower tax 
rate, the ETC keeps the average tax rate low at low incomes, but it imposes a smaller burden on the budget. 
This budget surplus can be used for various policy measures such as, for example, lowering marginal tax 
rates for higher earners. 
Our simulation exercises provide evidence that the tax system and the transfer system should be taken into 
account simultaneously. For example, in countries where some transfers are taxed as income, a tax rate cut 
(or increase) will also affect positively (negatively) the net transfers one can get at zero hours worked, which 
will, ceteris paribus, decrease (increase) individuals’ incentives to work. 
The highest long-run employment gain can be obtained if the tax cut is financed by transfer tightening. Such 
a policy package affects individuals’ gains to work and therefore willingness to work both at the transfer 
and at the net wage side. However, it is important to keep in mind that our model is solely based on financial 
incentives and do not take into account some potentially important features of the economy such as labour 
market frictions and skill mismatches. For example, the shortening of the unemployment benefit period will 
make the individuals want to find a job earlier and therefore they increase their labour supply, but a shorter 
job-search period may also impair the quality of employee-employer matches. This effect is not taken into 
account by the model and, as a result, we might overestimate the employment effect of such a measure. 
Furthermore, such a policy may have adverse effects on income inequality and poverty. 
If the main objective is to boost labour productivity and GDP, different policy measures should be applied. 
As individuals at the top of the income distribution are relatively responsive at the intensive margin, 
decreasing the marginal tax rates improves incentives at the top of the income distribution and boosts 
effective labour and GDP in the long-run. Similar results can be obtained by decreasing capital taxes. This 
latter policy is especially effective in small open economies where capital supply is highly elastic. 
In the third exercise, we evaluate the impact of actual tax and transfer changes in the two years before the 
general elections in 2010 and three years after. We find that the packages of the two governments during 
this period have different macroeconomic effects. The changes between 2008 and 2010 increase long-run 
employment and GDP; but there is no significant adjustment at the intensive margin. In contrast, the 
changes between 2010 and 2013 produce a large gain at the intensive margin of labour supply, but 
employment is expected to increase only due to cuts in the unemployment benefit. Both policy packages 
are found to increase income inequality in the long run (the changes after 2010 about four times more than 
the changes before 2010); the cumulative change has the potential to move Hungary to the median of EU 
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member states from its original ranking as the country with the 6th most equal income distribution among 
the EU-27. 
At a general, methodological level, our microsimulation model has two important features. First, it is 
behavioural, which means that it takes into account the labour supply response of individuals at the 
intensive and extensive margin. This is done by merging the elasticity of taxable-income literature and the 
discrete choice labour supply literature. Second, the labour supply shocks that result from individual 
behavioural responses to tax and transfer reforms are fed into a long-run neoclassical model of a small open 
economy.  
This linked micro-macro modelling approach allows us to trace general-equilibrium feedback effects 
through labour demand, capital demand and capital supply. More importantly, this approach enables us to 
assess the macroeconomic and labour market effects of changes to the corporate side of taxation. Still, the 
macro model is parsimonious and transparent: it consists of an aggregate production function and a capital 
supply curve, ensuring that input prices equal their marginal products and that capital supply is elastic. The 
overall simplicity and tractability of the model makes it easily extendable to fiscal analysis in other countries 
as well. 
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APPENDIX 
Extensive margin results 
Table A1: Conditional marginal effects at the extensive margin 
    Structural Reduced-form17 
Full sample (15–74) 
net wage 
0.34 0.28 
[0.007] [0.006] 
transfer 
-0.12 -0.09 
[0.002] [0.002] 
Prime age (25–54) 
net wage 
0.25 0.15 
[0.004] [0.003] 
transfer 
-0.08 -0.05 
[0.001] [0.001] 
- elementary school or less 
net wage 
0.34 0.27 
[0.006] [0.005] 
transfer 
-0.11 -0.09 
[0.002] [0.002] 
- secondary education 
net wage 
0.23 0.15 
[0.004] [0.003] 
transfer 
-0.08 -0.05 
[0.001] [0.001] 
- tertiary education 
net wage 
0.16 0.08 
[0.004] [0.002] 
transfer 
-0.04 -0.03 
[0.001] [0.001] 
- single men 
net wage 
0.11 0.11 
[0.004] [0.002] 
transfer 
-0.04 -0.03 
[0.001] [0.001] 
- single women 
net wage 
0.29 0.19 
[0.007] [0.004] 
transfer 
-0.11 -0.07 
[0.002] [0.001] 
- married men 
net wage 
0.14 0.09 
[0.003] [0.002] 
transfer 
-0.04 -0.03 
[0.001] [0.001] 
- married women 
net wage 
0.43 0.24 
[0.007] [0.005] 
transfer 
-0.15 -0.09 
[0.002] [0.002] 
Source: Galuščák and Kátay (2017) 
  
                                                          
17 This column corresponds to the gains-to-work methodology employed in Benczúr et al. (2014), Galuščák and Kátay (2017), 
Horváth et al. (2017); being further developed in Benczúr and Kátay (2017). 
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Details of the general equilibrium model simulation 
The production function of the representative firm exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES).18 The 
profit-maximisation problem of firms can be formulated as:19  
max(𝛼𝐾𝛽 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝛽)
1
𝛽(1 − 𝜏𝑠) − 𝑤(1 + 𝜏𝑊)𝐿 −
𝑟
1 − 𝜏𝐾
𝐾. 
Here, 𝜏𝑠 is the effective tax rate on sales (representing, in the baseline, the effects of the local business tax), 
𝑤 is the gross wage, 𝜏𝑊 is the rate of employer-side social security contributions (equivalent to a payroll 
tax), 𝜏𝐾 is the effective tax rate on capital and 
𝑟
1−𝜏𝐾
 is the net user cost of capital.  
The model is closed by the equation that determines the aggregate supply of capital. Capital is provided by 
an international capital market. Its supply is modelled in a reduced form: ?̂? = 𝜂?̂?, where η is the elasticity 
of capital supply K with respect to the after-tax rate of return r (and 𝑥 denotes the percentage change of 
variable 𝑥).  
It is easiest to present the comparative statics results if we log-linearize the model around the equilibrium. 
After deriving the first-order conditions and log-linearization, we arrive at the following four equations:  
?̂? =
1
𝛼?̅?𝛽
(
1
1 − 𝛼
)
𝛽
1−𝛽 1
1 − 𝛽
(
?̅?(1 + 𝜏𝑊̅̅ ̅̅ )
1 − 𝜏?̅?
)
𝛽
1−𝛽
(?̂? + (1 + 𝜏𝑊)̂ − (1 − 𝜏𝑠)̂ ) 
?̂? =
1
𝛼?̅?𝛽
(
1
𝛼
)
𝛽
1−𝛽 1
1 − 𝛽
(
?̅?
(1 − 𝜏𝐾̅̅ ̅)(1 − 𝜏?̅?)
)
𝛽
1−𝛽
(?̂? − (1 − 𝜏𝐾)̂ − (1 − 𝜏𝑠)̂ ) + (
1
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛽
?̂? 
?̂? = ?̂? − ?̂? 
?̂? = 𝜂?̂? 
Here, k is the capital-labour ratio and ?̅? denotes the ex-ante equilibrium value of variable 𝑥. The first 
equation ensures that wages are equal to the marginal product of labour, while the second equation 
ensures that the return on capital is equal to its marginal product. The labour supply shock ?̂? is the result of 
microsimulation (reflecting both the exogenous labour supply response to the policy shock and the 
endogenous response to the change in wages).20 A balanced budget restriction is not imposed (see a 
discussion of this point in Section 2.4).  
 
  
                                                          
18 Previous estimations of factor demand and the substitutability between labour and capital rejected that the Cobb-Douglas 
production function can be used. See Kátay and Wolf (2004) for an estimation of the demand for capital.  
19 We write the firm’s problem in net terms, so it does not contain the value-added tax (VAT). The VAT is, however, included in the 
net wage entering the labour supply decision. 
20 VAT and labour taxes directly affect labour supply. 
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Calibration of the macro model part 
The parameters of the model are calibrated based on previous estimations and simple statistics taken from 
national accounts. 
1) Taxes on capital (corporate income tax and other, less significant, corporate taxes) and consumption 
(VAT and other, less significant, consumer taxes) are calculated as effective tax burdens on 
aggregates taken from national accounts. The initial (2008) effective tax rate on capital is 𝜏𝐾 =
0.073, while the initial effective tax rate on sales (calculated as total tax revenue divided by GDP) is 
𝜏𝑠 = 0.0174. The effective tax rate on consumption is 𝜏𝑉𝐴𝑇 = 0.182.  
2) The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the production function is chosen based 
on estimations of Kátay and Wolf (2004): 𝛽 = (𝜎 − 1)/𝜎 = (0.8 − 1) 0.8⁄ = −0.25 . 
3) The net user cost of capital is computed as described in Kátay and Wolf (2004). Its average value for 
the period 2005-2008 is 0.155. 
4) The capital income share is calibrated based on averages from national accounts: 
[
𝑟
(1 − 𝜏𝐾)(1 − 𝜏𝑠)
𝐾] / 𝑌 = 0.35. 
Using the production function and the net user cost, the capital income share pins down also the 
value of k, the capital labour ratio. 
5) Parameter 𝛼 is obtained by rearranging the first order condition of profit maximisation with respect 
to capital:  
𝛼(𝛼𝐾𝛽 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝛽)
1
𝛽
−1
𝐾𝛽−1(1 − 𝜏𝑠) =
𝑟
(1 − 𝜏𝐾)
 
⇒ 𝛼 = (
𝑟
(1 − 𝜏𝐾)(1 − 𝜏𝑠)
𝐾
𝑌
)
1−𝛽
(
𝑟
(1 − 𝜏𝐾)(1 − 𝜏𝑠)
)
𝛽
= 0.429 
6) One can choose the units such that L=1, thus K=k and the first order condition of profit maximization 
with respect to labour determines the wage w. 
7) It is left to calibrate 𝜂, the elasticity of capital supply with respect to the after-tax return on capital. 
The two extreme cases are perfect capital mobility (𝜂 = ∞) and perfectly inelastic supply of capital 
(𝜂 = 0). The former is a reasonable assumption in the long run, supported either by a small open 
economy assumption (the rental rate is set by the world rate) or a closed economy Ramsey model 
(the rental rate is determined by the rate of time preference); while the latter is probably a good 
description of the very short run. While the model can be run with any of these values, the results 
shown below are based on a quite elastic capital supply (𝜂 = 15).  
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Main policy parameters in the simulation scenarios 
 
Table A2: Parameters of hypothetical tax scenarios from Table 1 
 
Baseline 
(2008) 
Across-the-
board tax cut 
Flat 
tax 
Two rates, 
no ETC 
One rate, 
with ETC 
Lowest PIT rate 18% 17% 20.1% 0% 26.2% 
Upper limit of the lowest PIT rate  1 700 000 1 700 000 - 828 000 - 
Middle PIT rate 36% 35% - - - 
Upper limit of the middle PIT rate  7 137 000 7 137 000 - - - 
Upper PIT rate 40% 39% - 32% - 
Rate of ETC 18% 17% - - 23% 
Maximal amount of ETC (per month) 11 340 11 730 - - 18 078 
Start of ETC phase-out 1 250 000 1 250 000 - - 1 700 000 
ECT phase-out rate 9% 9% - - 19% 
 
Table A3: Parameters of actual tax scenarios from Table 3 
 
2008 2010a 2013 
Lowest PIT rate 18% 21.59% 16% 
Upper limit of the lowest PIT rate  1 700 000 3 937 008 - 
Middle PIT rate 36% - - 
Upper limit of the middle PIT rate  7 137 000 - - 
Upper PIT rate 40% 40.64% - 
Rate of ETC 18% 21.59% - 
Maximal amount of ETC, monthly 11 340 15 100 - 
Start of ETC phase-out 1 250 000 2 510 236 - 
ECT phase-out rate 9% 15.24% - 
Child tax credit (monthly, 1st and 2nd child) 0 0 - 
Child tax credit (monthly, 3rd, 4th... child) 4 000 4 000 - 
Child tax credit (monthly per child, 1 or two children) - - 10 000 
Child tax credit (monthly per child, 3 or more children) - - 33 000 
Employer contribution rate 32% 27% 27% 
Employee contribution rate (below contribution ceiling) 15.5% 17% 18.5% 
Effective tax rate on consumption 18.2% 19.4% 23.3%b 
Effective tax rate on corporate income 7.3% 7.3% 6.2%b 
Effective tax rate on sales (e.g., local business tax) 1.74% 1.65% 2.28%b 
Maximum length of unemployment benefits (months) 12 12 3 
Notes: a In 2010 (unlike in 2008 or 2013) the PIT code was based on a 'super-gross' income definition. 
Parameters here are translated into gross terms. b Effective tax rates on consumption, corporate income 
and sales include expert estimates of the central bank of Hungary based on legislation passed until August 
2012. The effective tax rate on corporate income includes only that part of sectoral ‘crisis taxes’ that 
are to be made permanent according to official government policy.  
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